Part VIII: Prologue

  1. Once these trends are recognised the obvious question arises – can they be reversed by:

    (a) The PPP in Government without an agreement with the opposition.

Or (b) Any other alternative non-PPP Government without the cooperation of the PPP.


 i) Some of the difficulties which are, and will be faced by such a government have been mentioned in Appendix II, paragraphs 15-19 below. Apart from these, any future administration will have to consider the need for some form of external association if the country is to expand and develop on any significant scale. The smallness of the population, the lack of available investment capital, the nature of the economy and the harsh realities of international politics all combine to make this a burning question which will soon have to be answered.

The corruption of the Federation issue in Guyana by irrelevant social and racial considerations has provided a good example of what is likely to happen to any attempt by either a rural or urban supported government to tackle any serious problem.

Therefore the inevitable conclusion (which has already been publicly recognised by some political leaders) stares us in the face – for a PPP government to undertake the necessary tasks it must first make serious inroads into the urban electorate.

This is where the vicious circle reveals itself. Because of its own internal structure the party is unable to carry out a successful programme; it must therefore obtain considerable urban support: but until such a programme is executed it cannot attract that support.

  1. ii) One suggested solution which will, it is thought break this circle, namely a large influx of foreign aid adequate in its nature and extent to support a programme of industrialisation and development which will create a contented, if not enthusiastic, urban group.

With this attitude the colonial mentality has entered a new era. Like all past colonial ‘solutions’, this one ignores certain basic facts.


  • the social and economic structure is radically reformed in order to ensure popular

participation and support,

  • a programme of reform and development is created which possesses some internal

relevance and consistency,

  • the internal economy itself produces a surplus adequate enough to bear the strains and stresses of development,
  • waste, graft and incompetence are eliminated by the creation of a sense or national dignity and pride, and,
  • a government with sufficient strength and stability exists to carry out and maintain the above,

then money and equipment poured into the country will very likely go down yet another South American drain.

Within the framework of a sensible national programme, external assistance can be of tremendous and even crucial significance. But it is the internal solution that is the pre-condition to assistance and not the other way around.

Even if this were not so, the assumption of easy and immediate foreign assistance rests on very weak foundations when one considers the following:

  • the improbability of any serious large scale assistance from the United States for any PPP government. This needs no explanation in the context.
  1. ii) the improbability of large-scale assistance even from the USSR in the light of recent events. In so far as this is concerned, recent events would tend to suggest that for her own internal reasons, Russia is moving towards a modus vivendi with the USA. Laos in the Far and Iraq in the Middle East, have provided examples of this trend. The Cuban crisis of October-November, 1962 marks the extension of this effort to Latin America and the Caribbean.

Thus, the supposed father of international revolution has begun to show a tendency to prefer to deal with neutral but ‘stable’ regimes rather than to assist in the creation and maintenance of more extreme administrations which might prove to be both internally unstable and externally embarrassing.*

(iii) the existence of a large and powerful section comprising about half the total population, which is openly hostile to the government, provides external forces with a lever which they can use at crucial moments to frustrate the government’s intentions.

In any case, the effects of assistance, on however large a scale, take time to make themselves felt – and therefore give the opposition (internal and external) time to mobilise.

The use of a national army to maintain order and to act as an internal lever to assist in development projects has to be considered. The very creation and composition of such an army, except under conditions of national unity, will raise acute tensions which will be further aggravated by its use. Though a necessary part of any national programme, such an army cannot by itself and in the absence of more basic factors as outlined above, provide a solution.

Thus, the circle remains, and meanwhile the Internal situation develops an inner compulsion which threatens to take the society past the point of no return. The divisive forces having achieved an increasing dominance, only a great national effort by BOTH major groups can break the circle.