Part V: The Independence Constitution

56. Thus, if it is accepted for the moment that:

• Reasonable electoral reform will yield a balanced Legislature (between the two main factions).

• A joint radical programme can be agreed upon by the two sides (See Part VI) then the chance of a coalition depends on whether individual and sub-group interests can be adequately catered for.

57. It is therefore necessary to identify the critical individual and sub-group interests in the situation:

• Top leadership interests inside the two main groups.
• Middle-line interests inside the two groups.
• Multiple interests outside the two main groups.

58. a) Top leadership inside the two factions are either accustomed to holding or accustomed to aspiring to holding Offices of State. In the nature of the situation there are legitimate interests to be respected and formal coalition must respect them. Indeed, if formal coalition does not propose to respect them there can be no coalition. In concrete terms, this means that any plan for coalition must assign supremely important functions to the two leaders and make room for most of the men of high rank on whom they rely for immediate help and support.b) The problem immediately arises as to how can the system contain so many men drawn from two ‘opposing’ camps and function effectively?c) As to room for more men, the number of offices can be expanded provided this does not conflict with programme and ideological requirements. The imperial administration tended to be over centralised and can stand decentralisation further to what has already taken place. Besides, where an organisation (e.g. Government) is taking on a multiplicity of new and complex tasks it may be desir­able to divide the structure into a number of single purpose sub-organisations. This helps clear perception of the tasks but places strain on the capacity for co-ordination, (to be catered for later, see 61 vi.b.)d) As to the smooth functioning of the system, this requires above all an agreed programme (already catered for). In addition, individual and institutional functions must be clearly demarcated and where joint action is inevitable and necessary the institutional frame must be built to stand strain and contain conflict.

59. Middle-line leadership inside the two groups would not want their opportunity to participate in public affairs restricted nor their upward mobility limited. Fortunately, the move to Independence and the extension of serious public effort which will accompany coalition will satisfy these demands in part. In addition, however, the membership of the Representative Chambers may have to be increased.* Fortunately this expanded chamber may be required in connection with the revision of the Electoral System and in its own right as a means partially of offsetting the effects of small scale. The smallness of numbers in the present Chamber tends to intensify personal conflicts.

60. The multiple interests outside the two main groups can be satisfied in a number of ways:In so far as they are politically inclined they can of course join the groups and accept their programmes or stand for elections on their own programme.In so far as these ‘outside’ interests are not politically inclined the programme should seek to encourage their participation in public effort and to make reasonable accommodation to their views. As these opportunities may not be enough to commit them to a new system, a sophisticated leadership would want to consider a second Chamber permitting participation without power. Fortunately, this Chamber may be required in its own right as a place to bring together non-political, skilled, reasonable and publicly important men who support the two main groups.

61. Consequent on the discussion undertaken in this Part V of the paper so far the following Constitutional Frame suggests itself:i) THE LEGISLATURE
    The core of the system will be the Legislature elected mainly on a first-past-the-post system based on revised boundaries, a larger number of constituencies and greater urban weighting. 70 members (double the present number) can profitably be elected in this way.

    ii) THE SENATE
    Alongside the Legislature will be the Senate, designed to encourage participation of a national leadership wider than the primarily political. This body should be mainly comprised of the tenants of certain roles who should accede to membership automatically. It could well comprise:

• Heads of Public Corporations (15)
• A selection of members of the National Development Council (15)

• Head of the Public Service Commission (1)

• Principal of the University and a selection of Deans (3)

• Say, 9 (three from each county) citizens, elected by universal lot every three years. (9)

• Holders of certain national honours (to be decided) (15)

• Chairman of the Court of Policy (see below) as President of the Senate (1)

This House would amount to about 60 persons in the first term. From the suggested composition it is clear that important discussion is very likely to take place. An excellent way of helping to guide national policy along sane lines is to have informed, responsible discussion. The suggested Senate would be the ideal place for such a discussion at a techno-popular level as well as at outright popular and outright technical levels. Voting on legislation would not be necessary in a Senate of this kind.

Footnotes:

* Given the area of the present Chamber, a physical problem of space may be posed. Immediately, this may mean the abandonment of the public gallery, ultimately a new House, Broadcasting and filming can substitute in the short-run.