Boorstein’s book is particularly strong in conveying the emotions and attitudes which were responsible for the fundamental reversal of policy in 1963 His presence at the centre of the decision-making process enables him to convey the perceptions of the decision-makers, as well as his analysis of what the real economic problems were.

Decisions emerged from the way the Cuban leadership grappled with economic problems, and neither a discussion of the real resource shortages nor a study of the changing attitudes of policy-makers alone would have conveyed as complete a picture as Boorstein’s approach does.

Boorstein is less successful in his discussion of theoretical issues than in recording what actually was occurring between 1959 and 1963. His opening discussion of Cuba as part of an imperialist system is quite’ good, providing empirical content to the theoretical proposition that relations between rich and poor capitalist countries tend to work to the detriment of the latter. In the Cuban case resource misallocation by monopolizing international corporations was apparently quite marked. But when dealing with the burning questions of socialist development policy – centralization versus decentralization, and moral versus material incentives – his conclusions are incomplete. With respect to planning in general he is clear that slavish imitation of methods used in European countries served Cuba poorly. He concedes that material incentives are necessary, but is clearly worried that they can be carried too far. Though centralization may be required especially to initiate the process of development, it too, if carried to an extreme, can result in less than optimal utilization of resources. Boorstein’s general conclusion seems to be that neither the appropriate type of planning, best utilization of material or moral incentives, nor degree of centralization can be determined a priori. Only the process of grappling with problems, he argues, can result in the emergence of appropriate answers.

The problem is that Boorstein does not indicate by what standards correctness or appropriateness should be measured.

Not only, for example, do questions of centralization and decentralization involve resource use, but also participation by the members of the society in decision-making. Presumably only when decision-making is decentralized will there be the opportunity for the population to participate meaningfully in decisions. Yet it may be that at least at the present stage of development, Cuba requires a fairly high degree of centralization for maximum growth to be achieved. The issue which Boorstein does not clarify is the nature of the trade-off between democracy on one hand and rapid development on the other, and the relative values which should be assigned to each. If a choice between democracy and development has to be made, how should it be made? A similar set of problems is relevant to the question of income differentials, the issue which lies behind the determination of the extent to which material incentives should be employed.

These kinds of issues are, or should be, extremely important for policy makers in developing countries, but arc not clearly analysed by Boorstein. He likes to appeal to a practical problem-solving approach, but in so doing he tends to overlook the fact that major principles are at stake, principles which will have a profound influence on the quality of the society which is being constructed. Exactly what is at stake for a nation when it chooses between concentration on monetary compensation or revolutionary enthusiasm as an incentive to work, or centralized or dispersed decision-making should he made explicit. Here however, Boorstein tends to be evasive by concentrating excessively on pragmatism as the solution to most problems.

Pages: 1 2 3 4